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Abstract In a report published in 2007 UNICEF measured six dimensions
of child well-being for the majority of the economically advanced nations.
No overall scores are given, but countries are listed in the order of their
average rank on the dimensions, which are therefore implicitly assigned
‘equal importance’. In this study we take ‘equal importance’ to mean that
the ﬁnal aggregation is symmetrical in the scores and the ranks, i.e. permuting
them leaves the aggregate unchanged. We rank the countries by aggregating
the numerical information using a variety of techniques, geared to the
measurement scales we distinguish (‘ordinal’, ‘interval’, ‘ratio’). The aggre-
gators are symmetrical and mildly demanding, emphasizing good performance
across the board. The rankings obtained deviate from the UNICEF ranking,
but not over-dramatically. Our purpose is not only to study alternative
approaches for the particular data at hand, but also to introduce and exemplify
new and useful aggregation techniques: we propose ways to select weights
for OWA-operators and weighted geometric means, and we suggest how to
circumvent the choice of a power for the power means. In addition we extend
the Borda method so that it values dominance as well.
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1 Introduction
The UNICEF Innocenti Research Centre in Florence, Italy, published in 2007
a report on ‘child poverty in perspective, an overview of child well-being in
rich countries’, see UNICEF (2007). In this path breaking work Innocenti
brought together the best available data for a multi-dimensional overview
of the state of childhood in a majority of economically advanced nations of
the world. It distinguished six dimensions: 1. Material well-being, 2. Health
and Savety, 3. Educational well-being, 4. Family and peer relationships, 5.
Behaviors and risks, and 6. Subjective well-being. Each dimension combines
components,thataggregateindicators;thestudycomprises18componentsand
40 indicators in total. We refer to the reports, UNICEF (2006, 2007), for an
in-depth and comprehensive discussion of the collection and construction of
the variables involved, including the unavoidable data limitations and intricate
methodological issues. At each level of the analysis the data are transformed
into z-scores, and simply averaged, up to the level of the dimensions.1 The
dimensions themselves are not averaged. Innocenti resisted the temptation to
calculate an overall score, because (see UNICEF 2007, page 39):
In part this is to maintain opacity and avoid leaning too hard on limited
data; composite indicators...need to be as transparent as possible both to
keep the process open to debate and to avoid elevatingthe data to heights
of authority that their foundations cannot sustain. But in part, also,
reducing the overview to a single score or number would undermine the
emphasis on children’s well-being as a multi-dimensional issue requiring
a wide range of policy responses. Sometimes the whole can be less than
the sum of the parts.
Nevertheless, UNICEF (Innocenti) presents a table with an overview of the
performances of the countries involved, where the listing is not in alphabetical
order, but is based on the average rank on the six dimensions. It also presents
‘main ﬁndings’ directly related to this ranking. These include the observation
that European countries, in particular the Northern countries, dominate the
top half of the overall league table and that there is no obvious relationship
between levels of child well-being and GDP per capita. In addition, care is
taken to divide the countries into three subgroups, with seven members each,
1So the weight that an indicator receives depends on the number of indicators constituting the
component that it belongs to, as well as on the number of components that form the dimension
containing the indicator. The transformation to z-scores in intermediate stages interferes with this.
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suggestive of ‘leaders’, ‘followers’, and ‘laggards’. We feel free therefore to try
to rank the countries ourselves and compare our results with the UNICEF
ranking as presented. The methods we use are based mainly on Dijkstra
(2008), where Ordered Weighted Averaging (OWA-) operators are analyzed
for situations where all criteria are deemed equally important. In particular,
we focus on a sub-class that awards good performance across the board: since
all criteria are important we want to see acceptable scores on all of them. This
contrasts with the simple mean where a bad score can simply be compensated
by a high score. Or, to put it in terms of policy, a simple average of the
scores can be improved by raising the score on any one of the criteria, but our
aggregators encourage to raise the lowest scores. The approach we use belongs
to a sub-family of Choquet integrals where sets of criteria are assigned weights
that exceed the sum of the weights for the separate criteria (so sometimes the
whole can be more than the sum of the parts).
An outline of the remainder of the paper now follows. The next section,
Section 2, takes the scores2 on the dimensions in descending order and aggre-
gates them using ‘concave, reﬂection neutral OWA operators’. The ensuing
ranking is compared with the ranking on the basis of the average score,
taken to be representative for the Innocenti approach. The original scores as
obtained from Innocenti are linear transforms of z-scores. Section 3 reverts
them to z-scores again and transforms the numbers into normal percentages,
i.e. we calculate the area under the normal density to the left of the z-score. In
this way we create a kind of ratio scale. We aggregate the percentages using the
direct analogue of the OWA-averages, namely the ‘concave, reﬂection neu-
tral, ordered weighted geometric means’. The representative ranking will be
compared with the one based on the simple geometric mean. We also use the
family of concave power means, with the harmonic mean as its representative.
The harmonic mean was suggested by Anand and Sen (1995) as a technique
that corrected in a moderate way for imbalances (in particular for imbalances
related to gender in the Human Development Index). In Section 4 we return
to the ranked data, as in Innocenti’s approach. Innocenti used in effect the
Borda method, where a country’s rank is determined by the total number of
countries it outperforms on each of the dimensions. We extend this by taking
into account also the total number of countries it outperforms on both of any
two dimensions, and similarly on any three dimensions, et cetera up to all six
dimensions, in order to honor dominance and a good balanced performance.
Countries are awarded points for the Borda numbers in a way that is consistent
with the approaches in the previous sections (except the power means). In
Section 5 we collect all rankings obtained. Section 6 concludes.
2We gratefully acknowledge Innocenti’s willingness to allow us to use their data.306 T.K. Dijkstra
2 A More Demanding Aggregator: Assigning Higher Weights
to Lower Scores
In this section we will aggregate the scores on the six dimensions, denoted by
x1,x2,...,x6,3 using
A(x) :=
6  
k=1
wk · x(k) (1)
where the wk ’s are weights and x(k) is the k-th largest score, so x(1) ≥ x(2) ≥
... ≥ x(6). These OWA operators were introduced by Yager (1988, 1996, 1999).
With equal weights we get the simple average, x. With all weight assigned
to w1 we take the best score to be representative, and we turn a blind eye
to the other scores, no matter how low. This approach is surely too lenient.
With all weight assigned to w6 the scores are summarized in an unforgiving
way by the worst score: there is no compensation whatsoever by any of the
other scores, no matter how high. This approach is surely too demanding. A
compromise that encourages good performance across the board, is obtained
by assigning weights to all scores, with higher weights to lower scores. It is
shown in Dijkstra (2008) that this is equivalent to concavity of A as a function
of x. This implies in particular that when two countries with scores x and y
respectively are valued equally, A(x) = A(y), a third country with scores in
between (: 1
2 · x + 1
2 · y) is valued higher. A related implication is that equal
scores on all dimensions are valued more than a diverse set of scores with the
same simple average: A(x,x,...,x) ≥ A(x1,x2,...,x6). In other words, below
average scores are not simply compensated by equally large above average
scores. This will be exempliﬁed below.
Concavity appears to be a natural requirement, but aggregators satisfying
it can still be overly demanding. The increase in the weights can be too large
for comfort, after all, the minimum score is still one of the possibilities. We
suggested in Dijkstra (2008) to add ‘reﬂection neutrality’ to ease things up.
This concept can be explained as follows. Suppose we have scores 4, 8, and
9 on three equally important criteria. The scores are grades, with the Dutch
interpretation: they range from 1 (worst) to 10 (best), with 5 (not passed, but
close) and 6 (just passed). The simple mean of the given grades is 7. The
differences between grades and mean are −3, +1 and +2 respectively. If we
reverse their signs, and add the ensuing numbers to 7, we get scores 5, 6 and
10, with of course the same mean. We will call the latter set of scores the
mirror scores, they are obtained by reﬂecting the old scores in the mean, so
to speak. Which sequence is better, (4, 8, 9) or (5, 6, 10)? The latter sequence
has both a better worst score and a better best score, but it also has a decidedly
lower median score. Without the lowest scores we have (8, 9) versus (6, 10),
3The approaches we use can be applied to any number of dimensions or criteria of course, there is
nothing peculiar about the number 6. But since this paper is not about mathematics, we prefer to
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and without the highest scores, (4, 8) versus (5, 6). It appears that one could
argue either way. We chose to impose equality for the aggregates of both
scores and mirror scores, called reﬂection neutrality, in addition to concavity.
More formally, we require that A(x) = A(y) for every x and y that mirror
each other, meaning that yk , the observation on the k-th dimension, equals
x − (xk − x) whereas xk = x + (xk − x). It can be shown that the set of weights
satisfying both concavity and reﬂection neutrality equals all possible weighted
combinations of the rows of the following matrix E, say:
E :=
 
   
 
   
 
 
111111
011112
001122
000222
 
   
 
   
 
 
÷ 6. (2)
(Note that E is constructed in a very simple way, valid for all numbers of
criteria: start with a row of ones, take away the ﬁrst ‘1’ and add it to the last
‘1’ to get the second row, then take from the second row the ﬁrst ‘1’ and
add it to the penultimate element to get the third row; repeat this until only
one ‘1’ or no ‘1’ is left). The ensuing averages combine weighted averages
covering the lower half of the scores and more. The minimum score is no
longer an option. Now the most unforgiving aggregator, the least inclined to
allow for compensation, is the average of the lowest three scores. Had we
ignored reﬂection neutrality, we would have combined all averages of the form
x(k:6) := (xk + ... + x6) ÷ (7 − k). It is useful to note that when we average the
rows of E we get the barycentre of the convex polytope generated by these
rows: [1,2,3,5,6,7] ÷ 24. It is the representative weight vector for concave
reﬂection neutral weights. It yields almost the rank weighted average with
weights [1,2,3,4,5,6] ÷ 21. For uneven numbers of criteria the rank weighted
average is representative. See Dijkstra (2008) for more general results.
We took 10.000 random combinations of the rows of E,f o re a c hc o m -
bination we calculated overall scores for all of the countries involved and
ranked them. (Here rank is deﬁned as in sport competitions: one plus the
number of countries with a better score.) Finally we noted how often each
country occupied every one of the possible ranks,4 and sorted the countries
according to the average rank. This agrees with the ranking obtained using the
representative weights. Table 15 collects the results.
Please observe that the scores are in descending order, so the identity of the
dimensions is erased, in agreement with the assumption of symmetry or ‘equal
4The 10.000 combinations virtually guarantee that the percentages obtained are well within 1
percentage of the values obtainable with an ‘inﬁnitely large’ sample. This accuracy sufﬁces for
practical purposes.
5We deviate in one respect from the data as given by Innocenti. There was insufﬁcient information
to assign the USA a score on dimension 6, ‘Subjective well-being’. Innocenti ranked the countries
by their average ranking on the dimensions, using only 5 dimensions for the USA. This meant
that the USA effectively got the average rank on this dimension. An analysis of the data indicated
however that a score equal to Canada’s score on dimension 6 with rank 15 had some plausibility.
We work with this throughout this paper. Other choices are possible, it will not matter a great deal.308 T.K. Dijkstra
Table 1 Innocenti’s scores, sorted
(1)( 2)( 3)( 4)( 5)( 6)( x)
1. Netherlands 118.3 112.8 112.4 112.0 108.2 101.6 1
2. Sweden 120.2 118.7 114.9 108.7 104.6 98.0 2
3.Norway 117.5 104.3 103.6 102.1 102.0 100.8 5
4. Finland 115.3 111.5 110.8 104.0 99.2 96.4 3
5. Denmark 112.2 110.5 106.7 102.2 100.9 97.8 4
6. Switzerland 110.0 108.3 106.2 102.0 101.2 95.5 7
7. Spain 116.6 106.5 106.2 103.8 99.7 91.2 6
8. Germany 104.0 102.0 101.5 100.0 99.3 97.2 11
9. Ireland 110.3 106.9 106.7 104.3 90.7 89.2 9
10. Belgium 116.2 106.5 105.2 99.0 91.6 91.0 8
11. Italy 115.3 106.3 102.7 99.5 96.6 83.8 10
12. France 105.0 102.0 99.5 99.4 92.0 90.8 14
13. Greece 115.5 103.7 100.8 94.8 91.2 90.3 12
14. Canada 114.0 105.4 97.2 94.3 93.5 89.3 13
15. Czech R. 103.9 102.9 101.0 100.1 91.0 87.2 16
16. Austria 108.0 104.6 97.5 96.2 86.3 85.5 17
17. Portugal 115.0 96.3 96.2 93.9 93.7 81.9 18
18. Poland 113.6 112.5 99.0 95.8 85.2 80.2 15
19. Hungary 105.8 95.9 95.8 92.8 91.1 82.4 19
20. USA 96.0 93.5 92.8 83.4 80.3 80.0 20
21. UK 98.0 91.1 89.1 82.3 77.6 72.5 21
importance’. Innocenti has normalized the z-scores in such a way that their
average equals 100 and their standard deviation 10. We rounded the scores to
the ﬁrst decimal to ease the readability. As one can see, the ranking based on a
more demanding way of aggregating differs from the one based on the simple
average, indicated by the column headed by ‘(x)’. In particular, Germany, with
a slightly lower average than Italy, is placed above Italy. Germany has scores
hovering around 100, whereas Italy is once well above 100 but also well below
100. The bad score is not simply balanced out by the good score.
3 Means Appropriate for Ratio Scales
In the previous section we analyzed data that can be described, loosely and
not without abuse of terminology, as measured on an interval scale. More
precisely, we can multiply all numbers with the same positive constant and
add an identical constant of any sign without changing the information: the
mean of 100 and standard deviation of 10 are arbitrary. This entails that
means like geometric or power means are not appropriate for the given data
set. But they are appropriate, if we transform the scores into percentages
by calculating the area below a density to the left of the original z-scores.
Many densities are possible but we will use the normal or Gaussian density
for illustrative purposes. So the score xi on the i-th dimension is replaced
by  ((xi − 100) ÷ 10) where  (z) :=
  z
−∞
 
1/
√
2π
 
· exp
 
−1
2 · x2 
dx for realChild well-being in rich countries... 309
values of z. We will not adjust the notation, in this section xi now stands for
the normal percentage score.
The obvious counterpart of the simple, arithmetic mean is the simple
geometric mean, g, say, deﬁned as
g(x) :=
 
 6
i=1xi
 1/6
. (3)
The corresponding OWA- operator is
G(x) :=  6
i=1x
wi
(i) (4)
where the x’s are sorted again in descending order. With increasing weights
G has the property that when two vectors of scores x and y have identical
valuations, G(x) = G(y),t h e nG(z) ≥ G(x) = G(y) for any z between x and y,
that is zi := xλ
i y
1−λ
i for any λ ∈ [0,1], the same for all i. So the more balanced
the scores, i.e. the smaller the variation, the higher the valuation. As before
we will also demand ‘reﬂection neutrality’. This means here that when we take
yi := g(x) · (g(x)/xi), so that g(y) = g(x) and the y-scores can be said to mirror
the x-scores, then G(y) = G(x). Consequently, the weights of the previous
section can be used again. Ten thousand different weighted combinations
of the rows of the matrix E were generated, and for each combination we
calculated the overall scores and ranked the countries. We ascertained how
many times each possible rank was occupied and sorted the countries on the
basis of their average rank. This happened to agree with the ranking based on
the representative weights. Section 5 collects the results and also shows how
countries rank using the simple geometric mean.
Anand and Sen (1995) advocated the use of the harmonic mean for valua-
tions of scores where balance is important, or rather where imbalance ought
to be penalized, as in the case of the Human Development Index corrected
for gender inequality. The harmonic mean is a member of the family of power
means, Pα(x), say, deﬁned by
Pα(x) :=
 
6  
i=1
xα
i /6
 (1/α)
(5)
where α is a real number, different from zero. It is natural to deﬁne P0 (x) :=
g(x),s i n c ePα(x) → g(x) when α → 0. The power mean is increasing in α,
it ranges from the minimum score for α =− ∞to the maximum score for
α =∞with well-known stops in between: the harmonic mean for α =− 1,t h e
geometric mean for α = 0, the simple arithmetic mean for α = 1. See Steele
(2004) for a beautiful and complete analysis. An intuitive explanation is as
follows. Exponentiation by α scales the observations, so raising both sides of
equation(5)tothepowerα,yieldsthatthescaledpowermeanisjustthesimple
average of the scaled observations. A graphical analysis quickly reveals that
when α belongs to [0,1) or to (−∞,0), scaling stretches the lower range of
the percentages and does the opposite to the higher range. So if we undo the
scaling of the power mean we get a number that is closer to the lower scores310 T.K. Dijkstra
than the simple mean of the scores. The effect is stronger the further α is to the
left of 1.F o rα>1 the opposite happens.
We obtain concavity of the power mean if and only if α ≤ 1, see Bullen
(2003). In other words, if α ≤ 1 and the scores of two countries have the same
power mean, a country with scores in between will be valued higher.
Anand & Sen suggestedthe harmonic mean because they felt that it imposes
a moderate penalty for imbalance, but they did not offer compelling arguments
against values other then α =− 1. We propose here to use the whole concavity
range, α ≤ 1, and select values according to the density that maximizes the
entropy among all densities with expected value equal to minus one. It is
easily veriﬁed that the maximum entropy density is exponential, it equals
1
2 exp
 1
2 (α − 1)
 
on α ≤ 1. We can generate values from this density using
1 + 2 · log(U) where U is uniformly distributed on [0,1]. (If we had wanted
the representative average to be the geometric mean, we would have used
1 + log(U)). So we work as before, generating 10.000 different α’s, calculating
for each α overall scores for the countries, ranking them, counting the number
of times all possible ranks are attained, and ﬁnally sorting them according to
the average rank.6 In this case the average rank disagrees for a number of
countries with the rank obtainable for the harmonic mean. We had expected
this to happen also for the geometric means, but it did not. Section 5 has the
results.
A ﬁnal remark: there are many, many ways of aggregating scores on a
‘ratio’ scale. For an extensive overview of what the virtually limitless ingenuity
through the ages has accomplished in this respect we refer to Bullen (2003).
The geometric means and power means are perhaps among the more well-
known and best understood in terms of axioms and generating functional
equations, see also Aczél (1966, 2006).
4 Aggregation of Ranks, Rewarding ‘Dominance’
When Innocenti constructed the overall league table, it effectively summed
the ranks on all six dimensions. This is equivalent to the famous Borda
method,7 named after the French mathematician and naval hero de Borda,
who introduced it to the French Academy of Sciences in 1770 (but documented
applications by the Romans go back as far as the ﬁrst century). Its pros and
cons as a means of aggregating rankings are extensively discussed, if not hotly
debated, starting with de Borda versus Condorcet. The matter is not quite
6We could deﬁne the expected value of the power mean of the scores of each country with respect
to the exponential distribution just speciﬁed, as the power mean of country scores (the expected
value will inherit the concavity). The ranking could then be based on these means. This has the
advantage that the relative ranking of the countries at hand does not change when other countries
are added.
7Listing the countries in ascending order of the sum of the ranks is equivalent to ranking them
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settled till this day.8 We venture here to add a variation, that attempts to
award dominance on subsets of the dimensions. The basic idea is to extend the
so-called Borda Count, B1 say, calculated for each country by summing the
number of countries it outperforms on each of the separate dimensions. We
suggest here to also count the number of times it does better on both of any
two dimensions, denoted by B2, similarly for any three dimensions, denoted
by B3, et cetera, up to and including the full set of six dimensions, B6.S of o r
each country we obtain a vector B := (B1, B2, B3, B4, B5, B6) that captures
the extent to which the country dominates its competitors. The question now
is how to assign credits to B, acknowledging the implicit double counting in
its components. In order to do that in a relatively clean way, we resort to
a transformation of B, denoted by A := (A1, A2, A3, A4, A5, A6) where Ai
counts the number of times the country outperforms the others on exactly i
dimensions, not as before on at least i dimensions. It can be shown that
Ai =
6  
j=i
  j
j−i
 
(−1)
j−i Bj, (6)
Bi =
6  
j=i
  j
j−i
 
Aj. (7)
In particular, B1 = A1 + 2 · A2 + 3 · A3 + 4 · A4 + 5 · A5 + 6 · A6, as intu-
itively obvious. If we award outperformance on exactly i dimensions by Ci
credits, a country receives in total
 6
i=1 Ci · Ai points; we naturally put C0 := 0.
In terms of Borda Counts we have, as one may verify:
6  
i=1
Ci · Ai =
6  
i=1
∇iCi · Bi (8)
where ∇ is the backward difference operator, so that ∇1Ci = Ci −
Ci−1,∇2Ci =∇ 1  
∇1Ci
 
= Ci − 2 · Ci−1 + Ci−2 et cetera, in short ∇iCi =
 i
j=0
 i
j
 
(−1)i−jCi−j. Therefore the coefﬁcients of the Borda Counts measure
how fast the ‘credits function’ grows. Clearly, Ci will increase or at any rate
not decrease with i.I fw en o r m a l i z eb ys e t t i n gC6 = 6 we can reproduce
Borda’s method by taking Ci = i, as is clear from the expression for B1.
But more can be done if we want to award dominance: it seems reasonable
to take C2 − C1 ≥ C1 − C0 > 0, so ∇2C2 ≥ 0, and more generally ∇2Ci ≥ 0.9
8See e.g. Brams and Fishburn (2002) and Pattanaik (2002). Donald Saari has published extensively
about the Borda method, see e.g. Saari (2001a, b), emphasizing its ability to neutralize the (hidden)
symmetries responsible for many of the classical voting paradoxes.
9It is shown in Dijkstra (2008) that this is equivalent to Ci+j+k − Ci+j ≥ Ci+k − Ci for nonnegative
integers i, j,k. So k additional dimensions on which the country outperforms yields more credits
when it outperforms on more dimensions to start with.312 T.K. Dijkstra
However, as in Dijkstra (2008), we will restrict C somewhat, to soften its
demanding nature, by imposing reﬂection neutrality. This means simply that
we will generate credits functions using the cumulative weights of the weights
of Section 2. These cumulative weights, appropriately normalized, are E∗ say,
with
E∗ :=
⎡
⎢
⎢
⎣
123456
012346
001246
000246
⎤
⎥
⎥
⎦. (9)
Arbitrarycreditsfunctionscanbeobtainedbytakingarbitrarilyweightedaver-
ages of the rows of E∗. The representative credits function, where the rows are
equally weighted equals [1,3,6,11,17,24] ÷ 4. This is to be contrasted with
Borda’s [4,8,12,16,20,24] ÷ 4. The latter is linear, the former is ‘quadratic’.
As will be expected by now we generated 10.000 combinations of the
rows of E∗. For each combination, credits function, we calculated the points
for the countries, and ranked them. The average rank agreed once again
with the rank based on the representative credits function. Table 2 gives the
‘A-values’ for the countries listed according to the consensus ranking as well
as the Borda rank (as used by Innocenti).
The Borda Count B1, for the Netherlands equals 0 × 1 + 1 × 2 + 0 × 3 +
4 × 4 + 7 × 5 + 8 × 6 = 101 et cetera. The more balanced the outperformance
the higher the rank: roughly, the top countries have smaller counts on the left
side and larger counts on the right side, the opposite being true for the lower
Table 2 The number of countries outperformed on exactly 1,2,...,6 dimensions
A1 A2 A3 A4 A5 A6 Borda rank
1. Netherlands 0 1 0 4 7 8 1
2. Sweden 0 0 0 7 10 3 2
3. Finland 1 1 4 6 5 3 3
4. Denmark 3 1 3 5 5 3 5
5. Spain 0 1 5 6 5 2 4
6. Norway 2 3 3 3 7 2 7
7. Switzerland 1 2 5 4 7 1 5
8. Italy 3 1 8 4 3 1 8
9. Belgium 1 6 4 6 2 1 9
10. Ireland 0 2 8 8 1 0 9
11. Germany 4 3 5 3 2 2 11
12. Greece 0 6 8 1 3 0 12
13. Canada 5 4 6 3 2 0 13
14. Czech R. 2 5 6 2 1 1 16
15. France 5 4 5 4 0 1 14
16. Poland 1 11 5 3 0 0 14
17. Austria 7 6 4 2 1 0 17
18. Portugal 8 4 3 3 1 0 18
19. Hungary 7 6 4 2 0 0 19
20. USA 9 3 0 0 1 0 20
21. UK 4 5 0 0 0 0 21Child well-being in rich countries... 313
Table 3 Innocenti’s ranks, sorted
(1)( 2)( 3)( 4)( 5)( 6) Borda rank
1. Netherlands 1 2 3 3 6 10 1
2. Sweden 1 1 1 5 7 15 2
3. Finland 3 3 4 6 11 17 3
4. Denmark 4 4 8 9 12 12 5
5. Spain 2 5 5 8 12 16 4
6 . N o r w a y 2889 1 0 1 37
7. Switzerland 4 5 6 9 10 14 5
8. Italy 1 6 9 10 14 20 8
9. Belgium 1 5 7 12 17 19 9
10. Ireland 4 5 7 7 19 19 9
11. Germany 9 10 10 11 13 13 11
12. Greece 3 7 11 15 17 18 12
13. Canada 2 6 14 15 17 18 13
14. Czech R. 8 10 11 11 18 19 16
15. France 7 9 12 14 15 19 14
16. Poland 2 3 14 16 20 21 14
1 7 . A u s t r i a 4 81 51 61 92 01 7
1 8 . P o r t u g a l 21 41 51 61 62 11 8
19. Hungary 6 13 13 17 18 20 19
2 0 . U S A 1 21 51 72 02 02 12 0
21. UK 13 18 18 21 21 21 21
ranked countries. Table 3 yields the original Innocenti information, where we
sorted the ranks in ‘descending’ order:
The Borda Count B1, for the Netherlands can now be calculated as (21 −
1) + (21 − 2) + (21 − 3) + (21 − 3)+(21 − 6)+(21 − 10)=20 + 19 + 18 + 18+
15 + 11 = 101 as before. We feel that with equally important dimensions the
‘A-table’ adds valuable information and helps to determine the position in the
group. But one should not overlook the pecularities of working with rankings
and Borda-type counts. We use ordinal information only, which can be an
advantage if differences or ratios on the original scales are not necessarily
meaningful, but it can also be wasteful. And as opposed to the other methods
we discussed, one cannot assign a stand-alone value to a country. Borda-counts
are by neccessity always relative to the group of countries one studies. Adding
another country could affect the relative ranking of the original members.
This is also the case with our procedure for ranking the countries, using 10.000
different sets of weights, but not necessarily so: we can use the weights to get
a representative score for a country, cf. footnote 6.
5 An Overview
Table 4 presents all the rankings as determined by the various techniques
we employed. The countries are listed in alphabetical order to avoid the
appearance of bias, and to ease the readability. The last column gives the full
range of the ranks that can be obtained with the general OWA-method, where314 T.K. Dijkstra
Table 4 (Representative) rankings
B1 A (x)a OWA/a (g)b OWA/g (α =− 1)( α ≤ 1) Range
Austria 17 17 17 16 16 17 16 16 14–19
Belgium 9 9 8 10 9 11 9 9 6–11
Canada 13 13 13 14 14 15 13 14 10–17
Czech R. 16 14 16 15 15 13 14 15 12–18
Denmark 6 4 4 5 5 4 4 4 3–8
Finland 3 3 3 4 3 5 5 5 3–6
France 14 15 14 12 12 12 10 11 11–17
Germany 11 11 11 8 8 8 7 8 7–16
Greece 12 12 12 13 13 14 12 12 8–16
Hungary 19 19 19 19 19 19 18 19 17–19
Ireland 10 10 9 9 10 9 11 10 5–14
Italy 8 8 10 11 11 10 15 13 7–15
Netherlands 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1–2
Norway 7 6 5 3 4 3 3 3 3–10
Poland 15 16 15 18 18 16 19 18 5–19
Portugal 18 18 18 17 17 18 17 17 12–18
Spain 4 5 6 7 7 7 8 7 4–8
Sweden 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1–2
Switzerland 5 7 7 6 6 6 6 6 5–10
UK 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 20–21
USA 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20–21
aThis corresponds to α = 1.
bThis corresponds to α = 0.
we average the sorted z-scores with arbitrary weights,10 not restricted to be
concave and reﬂection neutral. The range of possible ranks varies in principle
with the method chosen (as exempliﬁed by France whose rank based on the
harmonic mean lies outside of the given range). It is clear that depending
on how demanding (emphasizing the worst score) or how lenient (looking
mainly at the best score) one wants to be the ranks may vary a lot. A case
in point is Poland, whose scores range from 5–19, although high ranks are
rather infrequent (it occupies any of the ranks 5–10 in no more than 9% of
the cases). The headings above the other columns containing numerals are
probably self-explanatory, but to be a little more speciﬁc: B1,(x), (g) and
(α =− 1) indicate the rankings obtained based on the standard Borda method
(the Innocenti ranking), the simple mean of the z-scores, the simple geometric
mean and the harmonic mean of the percentage scores respectively; the others
are representative rankings for the extended Borda method (based on A),
and the ‘concave reﬂection neutral ordered weighted averages’, the additive
variant OWA/a (Section 2) and the multiplicative variant OWA/g (Section 3)
respectively.
10We used brute force here, by generating 40.000 different sets of weights, ranking the countries
for each set and noting the range. The Netherlands is ranked ﬁrst and second in 52% and 48% of
the cases resp., Sweden complements these ﬁgures. France occupies the ranks 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16
and 17 with probabilities 5, 11, 15, 22, 20, 18 and 9 resp.Child well-being in rich countries... 315
It is obvious that when countries do not show an approximate equally good
or equally bad performance on the dimensions, then their ranks depend on
the method chosen and the information used, whether ordinal,‘interval-’or
‘ratio-’scaled. Striking examples are provided by Italy and France if we take all
columns to be comparably relevant and adequate. If we discard the techniques
that use the normal percentages, which are arguably somewhat artiﬁcial, then
the picture is relatively stable. In particular, the partitioning into three groups
of equal size appears to be relatively robust, eventhough the within-group
variation is nonnegligible.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we analyzed aspects of the valuable data set Innocenti has
constructed for UNICEF to ‘assess the lives and well-being of children and
adolescents in the economically advanced nations’. With respect to content
we had nothing to add, we just looked at the ﬁnal scores per dimension,
and tried to construct reasonable overall rankings. Our starting point was the
assumption of equivalence of the six dimensions. This is implicit in the way
Innocenti put the overall league table together, and is consistent with the equal
weighting of indicators and components in the construction of the dimensions.
Innocenti’s position concerning the weighting issue is subtle and complicated
(UNICEF 2007, p.5):
Equal weighting is the standard approach used in the absence of any
compelling reason to apply different weightings and is not intended to
imply that all elements used are considered of equal signiﬁcance.
This may very well reﬂect the (early)stage the research is in aboutthe highly
complicated,high-dimensionalconceptofchild well-being.Soitmayindeedbe
quite sensible and rational to postpone the design of appropriate aggregators
when one is still predominantly concerned with the mapping and measurement
of the various aspects of the concept. Although of quite a different nature
and arguably inﬁnitely less important, there is nevertheless in some respects
a resemblance with the ranking of decathlon athletes who compete in ten
differentifnotincomparabledisciplines.Ittookmorethen70yearstoestablish
something of a consensus about how to decide who does best overall. Part of
the difﬁculty, and the source of the resemblance with child well-being, is of
course that a concept like ‘best all-round’ athlete is a somewhat free-ﬂoating
concept, not tied in a comprehensible way to some independent variable that
is measurable. The scales on which the decathlon scores are measured are not
constructed so as to optimally predict another variable. Similarly, the design
of the scales and the choice of the aggregator for child well-being are not
geared to the prediction of other variables, like ‘happiness as an adult’. Rather,
an attempt is made to summarize high-dimensional data by means of a one-
dimensional construct. The aggregators we suggested all try to do justice to
the idea that all dimensions are important, and that good performance across316 T.K. Dijkstra
the board is what one should aim for. Statisticians refer to these and similar
situations as ‘unsupervised learning’, as opposed to ‘supervised learning’,
where the success of a construction can be measured in terms of its ability
to predict other variables. A quote from Hastie et al. (2001), p.439 seems
appropriate here:
It is difﬁcult to ascertain the validity of inferences drawn from the output
of most unsupervised algorithms. One must resort to heuristic arguments
not only for motivating the algorithms, as is often the case in supervised
learning as well, but also for judgements as to the quality of the results.
This uncomfortable situation has led to heavy proliferation of proposed
methods, since effectiveness is a matter of opinion and cannot be veriﬁed
directly.
Onewayforwardcouldbetotrytoembedchildwell-beingintoatheorythat
weaves a web between it or its dimensions and other causally or predictively
related concepts. In other words, it could be helpful, albeit quite challenging,
to resort to full-blown latent variable modelling. Child well-being would then
be one of the latent variables, approximately measurable by its conditional
expectation given its direct indicators, or by a suitable linear compound such as
a canonical variable. Part of the challenge is due to the paucity of the data from
a statistical point of view, since the number of countries that can be measured
is rather modest. So the study may well require a longitudinal approach. But in
principle at least the weights of an index for child well-being can be chosen
to be mutually consistent with the weights of other relevant constructs,11
enhancing in the process their acceptability as well as their usefulness. Of
course, usefulness is the keyword here as is clearly recognized by UNICEF and
Innocenti: the goal is ultimately not to rank countries, but to devise ways and
means that help policy makers create the conditions in which child well-being
can be fostered all around the globe.
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